This paper departs from that tradition. It shows that when uncertainty is incorporated into the model, the taxation of corporate income can leave corporate investment incentives, and individual savings incentives, basically unaffected, despite the sizeable tax revenues collected. Further, in some plausible situations, such taxes might even cause a gain in efficiency. The explanation for these surprising results is that the government, by taxing capital income, absorbs a certain fraction of both the expected return to corporate capital and the uncertainty in that return. As a result, while investors receive a lower expected return, they also bear less risk when they invest, and these two effects seem to be largely offsetting.
This argument that the taxation of corporate income is nondistorting is entirely different from that of Stiglitz [1973] . Stiglitz's argument, developed in a certainty setting, relied on the possibility of 100 percent debt finance for marginal investments. For much of the argument in this paper, firms will be constrained to use only equity finance. When debt finance is allowed, the changes in the results are minor.
The argument is related to earlier analyses of the effects of taxes on the amount of risk bearing, e.g., Domar and Musgrave [1944] , Tobin [1958] , Mossin [1968] , and Stiglitz [1969] . These papers, however, all assumed that individuals no longer bear what risk is passed to the government. This paper develops a general equilibrium framework, in which individuals ultimately bear all the risk,1 and attempts to relate the argument more closely to real investment decisions and to the actual U.S. tax structure.
The argument will first be developed intuitively in Section I in a mean-variance setting. In Section II a more general and formal version of the argument will be presented. In Section III some generalizations of the model will be explored. Section IV is the conclusion. rate of return required by corporate shareholders, which by utility maximization must equal their marginal time preference rate. Also, let p equal the value of the marginal product of capital net of depreciation. Without any tax distortions, competition (and efficiency) requires that p = ra.
However, with a corporate tax at rate T, a property tax at rate t, and a personal tax on income from shares at rate e, the after-tax return to corporate capital becomes only (1 -e)(1 -v) (p -t).2 Competition requires that this return equal ra. It then follows that ra (1)
~ ~~~~ = t + (1-e) (1 -T)'
The three taxes in this setting compound to drive the marginal product of corporate capital sharply above the investors' marginal time preference rate. To illustrate the size of this distortion, let us set v = 0.5, a representative average corporate tax rate during the 1970s according to the figures in the Economic Report of the President. Also, assume that e = 0.16, which is approximately the personal tax rate on income to equity holders calculated by Feldstein and Summers [1979] , and assume that t = 0.013, a representative property tax on corporate capital according to the figures in Fullerton-Gordon [1983] .3 Finally, assume that the after-tax real return required by corporate investors is ra = 0.04, the figure assumed in Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley [1978] . These figures together imply that the equilibrium value of p equals 0.108, suggesting that a substantial excess burden is created by these taxes, given that the marginal time preference rate of investors equals 0.04. This procedure for modeling the effects of taxes is basically that used by Harberger [1962] and Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley [1978] , among others. However, the above argument ignores the effects of uncertainty. When we take uncertainty into account, the results change dramatically. Investors would now require that the expected after-tax real rate of return on an investment at least equal the after-tax real risk-free interest rate, which we denote by ra, plus enough to compensate for the risk in the return on the investment.
2. For simplicity, we assume that purely inflationary gains are not subject to tax, and ignore any inappropriate measurement of the tax base due to inflation. For further discussion of the effects of inflation, see Feldstein [1980] and Gordon [1983] .
3. The figures in Fullerton-Gordon [1981] equal half of property tax payments relative to the value of the capital stock. This halving of the tax rate was intended to capture, however crudely, the benefits from local public services that firms receive, which to a degree offset the tax payments they make.
In the context of the capital asset pricing model, the required risk premium on an investment would equal 8 = 6 r cov (p,rm)/var (rm), where rm is the excess in the rate of return on the market portfolio above ra, and rm is its expected value. If there were no taxes, then in equilibrium investment would occur until = r a + 8, where -is the expected real return on capital.
How do taxes affect the equilibrium value of j? After corporate taxes and property taxes, the expected rate of return would be (1 -T)(p -t). This then leaves (1 -e)(1 -T)(p -t) -ciT after personal taxes, where we assume that purely inflationary capital gains are taxed at a rate c, which presumably is smaller than e.
In equilibrium, this after-tax return ought just to equal the rate of return required by investors, given the risk. Let us assume that the excess return on the market portfolio remains unchanged. (This is a key part of the argument, which we focus on below.) Then the risk premium required on this marginal investment will equal only (1 -e)(1 -T)8 since the covariance of the after-tax return on the investment with that on the market is reduced by the factor (1 -e)(1 -4). Therefore, in equilibrium, we find that (1 -e)(1 -r)(--tca = ra + (1 -e)(1 -T)8, which implies that ra + c~r (2) Pt+(1 ( )+6 (2) P
~~~~( 1 -e )(1 -T)
To what degree does this differ from the equilibrium without taxes, where -= ra + 8? For purposes of illustration, let us assume that ra = -0.015, a figure implied, for example, by assuming that treasury bills are risk free, earn a zero real return before taxes as in Fama [1975] , yet accrue tax liability each year of 0.015 per dollar invested due to the full taxation of nominal interest.4 Also assume that c = 0.05 is the effective capital gains tax rate. With these figures along with the tax rate assumptions used previously, we find that the equilibrium -p is left almost exactly unchanged in spite of the taxes. As is shown below, these taxes will be distorting only to the degree that taxes would be paid even on a (perhaps hypothetical) risk-free real investment. ducing an average tax rate of 0.663? The simple explanation is that while investors receive much less after tax as a return on their investment, they also require much less in return since the investment is no longer as risky. In the example above, the fall in the risk premium required by investors just matches the fall in the expected after-tax return, leaving the equilibrium p unaffected. The government, in taxing away part of the return, is charging the market price for the risk that it absorbs. So far we have assumed that the investment was entirely equity financed. Yet, the tax law treats debt-financed investment more favorably. We have also ignored the investment tax credit and the effects of tax versus true depreciation rates. Fullerton and Gordon [1981] incorporate these further complications into the model. After much effort in measuring the needed parameters for 1973, they conclude that the various taxes on corporate income, rather than merely leaving corporate investment incentives unaffected, caused a slight increase in corporate investment incentives, at least in that year.
Let us return now to the assumption that the excess return on the market portfolio remains unchanged when taxes are introduced. If the utility function is quadratic, then the market risk premium is simply proportional to the variance of the total return received by individuals. Given that the government absorbs a sizable fraction of the risk as a result of the taxes on corporate income, one might have expected the market risk premium to fall. However, the government cannot freely dispose of the risk that it bears. Individuals must ultimately bear this risk, whether through random tax rates on other income, random government expenditures, or random government deficits. Stiglitz [1969] , it was implicitly assumed that the risk in government tax revenues is not borne at all by individuals. In this case, the risk premium on a taxed investment would fall to (1 -e)2(1 -T)28, and investment is stimulated by the tax due to the implied reduction in the amount of risk that individuals must bear-an efficiency gain. The assumption in this paper, that risk in government tax revenues is as costly to bear as privately traded risks, seems much more plausible.
II. GENERAL Two-PERIOD ANALYSIS
The results in the previous section do not rely on the special assumptions underlying a mean-variance analysis of risk. To show this, we redevelop the argument in this section using a general two-period utility function in a setting similar to that used by Diamond [1967] and Leland [1974] . We first characterize the equilibrium amount and allocation of capital when there are no taxes, and then investigate how the equilibrium changes when taxes are introduced.
A. Equilibrium Without Taxes
Let us assume that there are Jo potential firms. The jth firm, if it invests Kj units of capital in the first period, will produce a stochastic real return in the second period of Rj = fj(Kj)Oj + hj(Kj). Here, fj and h, are nonstochastic nonconvex functions, and Oj is a random variable with mean Oj.8 In the second period the firm pays back to its owners its initial capital stock, now worth (1 + T)Kj, plus the return Rj. The inflation rate wr is assumed for simplicity to be nonstochastic.
The firm in the first period "goes public" and sells shares of ownership in this return to individual investors. Denote the market value of these shares by Vj, where Vj implicitly depends on the amount of capital Kj that the firm promises to acquire. The initial owners of the firm when it goes public then divide the residual Vj -Kj among themselves. As noted earlier, we do not allow firms to use any debt finance. The implications of relaxing this assumption will be discussed later.
Before going public, the firm must decide how much capital Kj it will promise to acquire. We assume that in doing so the firm maximizes the value of the residual Vj -Kj going to its initial owners. (We show below that each of the initial owners will find this policy to be utility maximizing.) If Vj < Kj for all positive values of Kj, then the potential firm would never come into existence. Assume that the first J firms choose to go public and acquire positive amounts of capital.
For these J firms, Kj will be chosen such that aVjl/Kj = 1 at this K.. This implies that in equilibrium investors are willing to accept a stochastic real return in the second period of pj--fj(Kj)Oj + hj(Kj), with expectation p, on a dollar invested in the first period.
Let there be I individuals. Individual i has a utility function Uj(C0,C0) which depends on consumption in each of the two periods. For convenience, both C! and C? are expressed in nominal dollars, in spite of the presence of (nonstochastic) inflation. Individual i's initial wealth is W-plus an initial percent ownership sjj in each of the J firms which decide to go public. He can lend to (or borrow from) other individuals at a nonstochastic nominal interest rate r + r, with the amount lent being denoted by Di. He can also buy a percent sij of the shares issued by each of 7. As Leland [1974] points out, many alternative stochastic models are special cases of this formulation. For example, the formulation can be consistent with either price or production uncertainty, and with either competitive or noncompetitive firm behavior.
8. The joint distribution of the Oj is unrestricted.
the J firms when they go public. In doing so, he is subject to the budget constraint, tax revenue redistributed back to individuals in the second period in a lump sum fashion. The lump sum transfers will be designed to eliminate any income effects from the tax, so that we can focus on the effects of the price distortions.
Let us assume that the personal income tax is uniform across individuals and is imposed at a flat rate m on income from bonds and at a flat rate e on income from stocks. As before, assume that purely inflationary capital gains are taxed at a lower rate c. We assume that there is full loss offset.10
In addition, assume that the effects of the corporate and property taxes together are to tax income from capital at a rate v and to tax the replacement cost of the capital stock at a rate t. As before, we assume that the tax payments tKj are deductible from corporate income before v is imposed. To a degree, v and t represent the corporate tax and the property tax, respectively. However, the marginal corporate tax rate often differs substantially from the average corporate tax rate. We interpret v to equal the marginal corporate tax rate, while t is assumed set so as to produce the correct average tax rate from both corporate and property taxes together. For further discussion, see Section III.A.
With these taxes, when Kj is invested in thejth type of capital, it produces an after corporate and property tax income of R>* where (12) Rt = (1 -v) (fjOj + hj -tKj).
The new market value of this capital will be denoted by V'*. As before, we assume that firms invest in this capital until the market value of the after-tax return to a dollar additional investment just equals one. Also as before, the residual amount Vt -Kj is divided among the initial owners of the firm. When an individual now invests in bonds and stocks, his second period income will equal since Yisij = EIsij = 1. Since revenues equal transfers, the budget is balanced.
As a final step, we show that the same number of firms chooses to go public. A firm will go public with no taxes if and only if V, -K, : 0. But equation (19b) implies that V* -K1 is propor-
tional to Vj -Kj, so when one is nonnegative, the other is nonnegative. Therefore, the same set of J firms will choose to go public with and without taxes.
Q.E.D. Before proceeding, let us return briefly to confirm that the firm, when it chooses Kj so as to maximize V* -K, is in fact acting in the interests of its shareholders. If initial owner i were to choose the value of Kj best for him, he would choose that value maximizing his utility, taking into account the effects on V* but taking other prices as given. The resulting first-order condition would be We conclude that the Kj for which vj 1 is the optimal choice for any individual i. Therefore, all shareholders will want the firm to choose Kj so as to maximize V* -Kj, the assumed policy. If all tax rates were set to zero, this result continues to hold.
Let us now explore the implications of the above theorem. Since tax revenues were returned to each individual in a lump sum fashion, the theorem gives assumptions under which taxation of capital income causes no real change and consequently no efficiency loss whatever. Condition (b), while necessary to prevent any change in the equilibrium allocation, however, is not necessary to prevent any efficiency costs from the taxes. The equilibrium will certainly remain efficient with any nonstochastic change in the lump sum transfers.13 Redistributing the lotteries Q, among individuals will also have no efficiency effect, as shown in Diamond [1967] . Individuals trade freely in these lotteries, and will arrive at an efficient allocation of them regardless of government transfers.14 The key assumption, therefore, implying that these taxes are nondistorting, is condition (a). This condition requires that no net tax revenues be collected from any risk-free investment, which would earn a real rate of return in this case of r = (1 -m) r*-mTr. The parameter values used in the argument in Section I just satisfy this condition. As in Section I, however, the average tax rate can still be quite high. Equation (21) Therefore, tax revenues in effect come from a tax on pure profits plus a tax on the risk premium. The pure profits tax is clearly nondistorting. The tax on the risk premium leaves incentives unaffected, as in Section I, because the government provides just offsetting benefits to investors by absorbing the same fraction (T + e(1 -T)) of the risk in the return from the investment. We therefore conclude that taxes on capital income are distorting in this model only to the degree that the total taxes paid from the returns to a risk-free investment are nonzero. If these taxes are negative, then the tax law provides a net stimulus to savings and investment, even though the average tax rate can still remain very high. If the parameter value assumptions made above are close to correct, then the net distortion is at least very small.
The net distortion also depends in unexpected ways on some of the tax rates. For example, given the assumed parameter values, if the tax rate e on equity income were larger than 0.16, then there would be net subsidy to savings and investment. Similarly, if the marginal corporate income tax rate is higher than 0.5, then there is also a net subsidy. These counterintuitive results arise because taxable corporate income (r -t) on a risk-free investment is negative,16 given the other assumed parameter values. In either case, however, total tax revenue should go up, as seen in equation (20).
III. EXPLORATION OF UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
The model in Section II, while in some ways very general, still contains many restrictive assumptions. In this section we shall briefly explore how the results are affected if several of these 15. Note that the last term in equation (24) assumptions are relaxed. We shall find, as we relax assumptions, that the taxation of capital income can well result in an efficiency gain.
A. Average versus Marginal Corporate Tax Rate
So far we have assumed that the corporate tax is a proportional tax on economic income. Yet there are many reasons why, in the existing corporate tax, the average tax rate differs from the marginal tax rate on extra income. For example, both the investment tax credit and taxable depreciation not equaling economic depreciation will cause the two to differ (as would interest deductions when debt finance is allowed for). If we let the two rates differ, the previous argument changes in a straightforward way. Let Ta represent the average corporate tax rate and Tm the marginal rate. Then, returning to the derivation of equation (2), we see that the expected after-tax rate of return on a new investment would equal (1 -e)(1 -Ta)(P -t) -cTw. However, following the previous argument, we note that the risk premium required on this new investment now drops to (1 -e)(1 -Tm)n The implied equilibrium value of -becomes This condition implies that raising Tm, holding Ta constant, stimulates investment-passing more risk on to the government, while paying no more in taxes on average, is beneficial to investors. In contrast, raising Ta, holding Tm constant, discourages investment. The focus of this paper has been on the offsetting effects of taxes of collecting revenue from the firm but also of lessening the amount of additional risk borne by the firm's investors when new investment occurs. Here these two effects have been separated, with Ta describing how much revenue is collected and Tm describing how much risk is passed on to the government. Given the large size of 8 empirically relative to r a or t, the net tax effect ought to be very sensitive to the difference Ta -Tm.
Developing the argument more formally, following the approach in Section II, let us introduce an investment tax credit at rate k. Also, let the true depreciation rate be d while the allowed tax depreciation rate is d. Gross returns to capital, when Kj is invested, will now equal fjOj + hj + dKj. The return to capital after true depreciation, property taxes, and corporate income taxes, would now be17 (fjOj + hj + dKj) -dKj -tKj -T(fjOj + hj + dKj -dtKj -tKj) + kKj (1 -T) fjOj + h.
-(t + (T(d -dt)) -k) Kj1/(1 -T).
Comparing this with equation (12) in the text, we see that this more complicated set of tax provisions is equivalent to a corporate income tax at rate T and a property tax at rate t + (T(d -dt) -k)/(1 -T). The rest of the argument, using these revised tax rates, follows as before.
B. Introduction of Noncorporate Investment
In the above model all capital was assumed to be in the corporate sector. Let us now introduce a noncorporate sector with corporate capital is borne entirely by the proprietor, while proportional shares in the risk from corporate capital are distributed efficiently across individuals.
Let us now reexplore how the equilibrium conditions would be different when taxes exist. Assume that noncorporate firms face a property tax rate tn, and that proprietors have a personal income tax rate n on real income from their firms, and a personal tax rate Cn on inflationary capital gains. Now, the first-order condition for the proprietor's investment decision is The lump sum transfer to individual j must be larger by n(f707 + hn -rKn ).
Three interesting conclusions follow from this. First, capital will normally be misallocated between the corporate and noncorporate sectors, since the first two terms on the right-hand sides of equations (18) and (28), which measure the expected value of the marginal product in each sector net of risk bearing costs, will differ in general. However, the nature of the resulting misallocation of capital will likely be counterintuitive. For example, assume that tn = t and Cn = c but n < v + e(l -v), so that proprietors face a lower net tax rate on real income. Then with our previous parameter assumptions (which imply that (1 -m)r* -(m -c)rr < 0), the tax law would induce capital to flow out of the noncorporate sector into the corporate sector.'9 Second, if proprietors were given the option of incorporating, their choice would be surprisingly complicated. Let us assume 19. This occurs because the first two terms on the right-hand side of equation (28) We find that there are two offsetting aspects affecting the proprietor's decision. The difference between the first two terms reflects the pure profits earned by the firm. These profits would be taxed at a higher rate if the firm were to incorporate, thus discouraging incorporation. (Of course, if the firm were in a competitive industry with free entry, then pure profits would be zero.) Whether the increased tax rate on normal profits is a net cost or a net benefit depends on whether the real before-tax risk-free return (the last term) is positive or negative. Any extra taxes paid on the risk premium are entirely offset by the fact that the government also absorbs more of the risk. With the above parameter value assumptions, the before-tax risk-free return is negative, so the higher tax rate is a net gain. Therefore, in general, the proprietor's optimal choice would depend on the characteristics of his profit function as well as on the tax rates.20 Third, condition (bl) above prevents any redistribution of the risk in the return from noncorporate capital. This risk, however, is not distributed efficiently initially. Therefore, within the model, the government could create an efficiency gain by redesigning the lump sum transfers so as to shift at least some of the risk from a noncorporate firm away from the proprietor. The higher the tax rate n, the more of the risk the government can reallocate, so the larger the potential efficiency gain.2' A high tax rate n can cause condition (al) to be substantially violated, however, distorting noncorporate investment decisions. This counterbalancing cost can be lessened (or even eliminated), however, by suitable readjustment of the tax rate tn. Recall that tn incorporates effects from the difference between the marginal and the average personal income tax rates, as well as from property taxes. Therefore, if the net tax rate on the left-hand side of condition (al) is positive, at any given n, investment tax credits or a more liberal tax depreciation policy can be introduced so as to lower tn. This lessens the violation of condition (al) while maintaining n, and so the potential for redistributing risk in a more efficient manner.22
C. Inefficient Distribution of Corporate Risk
We have assumed so far that corporate risk would be allocated efficiently by the private market, with or without taxes. Therefore, unlike the situation with noncorporate risks, the government has no potential to improve on the allocation of corporate risk. However, there is some reason to presume that the private sector has not distributed this risk efficiently. According to the Statistics of Income for 1977, only 15.5 percent of tax returns reported any dividend income whatsoever, and only 10.6 percent reported dividend income exceeding the exempt amount of $200 for married couples and $100 for single individuals. (Of course, some individuals might own equity in a nontaxable form, such as through an IRA account.) Yet, in the above model, the optimal value of sij for an individual would almost always be nonzero.
Why then do such a large percentage of the population not own stock? Much of the explanation probably lies in the standard forms of market "imperfections"-trading costs, borrowing constraints, etc. Market institutions undoubtedly develop so as to minimize the importance of these problems, but do so conditional on the true resource costs involved in running a market, and on the statutory regulations governing individual bankruptcies.
If the government, however, faced lower costs in reallocating risk than the private sector, then it could potentially create an efficiency gain by shifting risk toward those who face a trading constraint preventing them from reaching the optimal amount of risk bearing.23 As with taxation of noncorporate income, the in-22. One further problem, however, is that n is also the tax rate on the labor income to the proprietor, inhibiting the use of a high n to redistribute risk.
23. If individuals face no constraint, however, then the government cannot create an efficiency gain by reallocating risk, even if risk is distributed inefficiently, since individuals will trade so as to undo any reallocation by the government.
centive would be to set a high corporate income tax rate, so that a large part of the risk goes to the government, it is hoped to be reallocated toward those who can bear it more cheaply. Any resulting distortions to investment incentives can then be corrected by suitable changes in the nonstochastic components of the tax structure, such as the investment tax credit or tax depreciation policies.24
For this to be worthwhile, however, the government must face lower costs than the private sector in reallocating risk. One situation where the government should find it cheaper is in the intergenerational reallocation of risk. In principle, efficiency would require that even unborn generations share in the risk in the return on existing capital. Yet these individuals do not trade currently in equity for the obvious reason that they are not yet alive. Also since they are not alive yet, there is no alternative way to set up a mutually beneficial contract ex ante to spread the risk across generations. If parents choose to leave bequests, or children choose to aid their parents, however, then the transfer can be adjusted to reflect the outcomes of current lotteries, without need of an ex ante contract. Otherwise, such sharing of risk is unlikely to occur through the private market.
The government can easily reallocate wealth across generations in this context through its debt management policy. When there is an unfavorable outcome, causing tax revenues to fall, it can run a deficit, creating government debt. This new debt replaces real capital in individual portfolios, implying a smaller capital stock available to following generations. By lowering their wage rate, and so their utility, this shifts some of the risk onto them. (Diamond [19651 Let us now assume that capital in use j faces a property tax rate tj and a corporate income tax rateTj. Then, in equilibrium, equation (18) In general, the sum of the first two terms on the right-hand side of equation (18a), which measures the marginal product of capital net of risk-bearing costs, will vary by use. Therefore, capital will indeed be misallocated. However, if (1 -m)r* < (mcO, then capital will move toward those uses facing higher values for Tj, though away from those uses facing higher values for tj.
In the special case where (1 -m)r* = (m -c)O, we find that any variation in Tj creates no additional distortions, so no reallocation of capital. More generally, the difference (1 -m)r* -(m -cOr would normally be very much smaller than the risk premium. As a result, the implied percent distortion in the required marginal product of capital (the right-hand side of equation (18a) would be very small, even with wide variations in T. For example, with the parameter values from Section I, the equilibrium p is 0.105. If, for any firm, the corporate tax were to be entirely eliminated, the equilibrium p increases to 0. 119, a change of only 13.3 percent. Similarly, if any firm were to face twice as large a property tax rate, its equilibrium p would increase to 0.118, a change of just 12.4 percent.26 We find that even very large changes in tax rates should cause only modest changes in the allocation of capital.
Therefore, while variation in Twill still cause a misallocation of capital across uses, capital may well be shifted toward more highly taxed uses, and the degree of misallocation, and so the distortion costs, caused by the varying tax rates ought to be small. 26 . Recall that p equals the value of the marginal product net of depreciation. The percent change in the value of the marginal product gross of depreciation, the value of the physical marginal product of capital, would be yet smaller.
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These conclusions are in sharp contrast to those from certainty models, as in Harberger [1962] .
E. Availability of Debt Finance
So far, we have assumed that firms use only equity finance. In allowing for debt finance, let us assume that the ModiglianiMiller [1958] theorem is satisfied, so that in the no-tax equilibrium the equilibrium conditions derived above remain unchanged.27 Then, in the tax equilibrium, the right-hand side of equation (18) represents the marginal cost of capital to the firm under the constraint that only equity finance be used. When the firm has the option of using debt finance, the cost of capital can only fall. Therefore, with debt finance available, the equilibrium marginal product of capital with taxes will be smaller than that implied by equation (18), implying a further departure from the standard results.28
IV. CONCLUSIONS
By treating uncertainty explicitly in modeling the effects of taxes on capital income, we have produced conclusions sharply at variance with those in earlier papers, where uncertainty is ignored. The principal contrasting conclusions here are as follows:
1. While the average tax rate on corporate capital income may be very high, the tax-created distortion to investment incentives can be very small, and could amount to a slight subsidy. The explanation is that, while investors given taxes receive a lower expected return, they also bear less risk when they invest, and these two effects are largely offsetting.
2. While the average tax rate on income from noncorporate capital is smaller than that on income from corporate capital, taxes may yet induce a slight flow of capital from the noncorporate sector to the corporate sector. The intersectoral distortion is likely to be very small, however. 
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3. It follows that the efficiency costs arising from tax distortions affecting either the amount or allocation of real investment can be very small. In addition, there could well be efficiency gains resulting from these taxes due to a reallocation of risk bearing across individuals and across generations.
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